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Abstract 
 
The paper explores the impact of entrepreneurial management dimensions on post-
MBO financial performance. We use Stevenson’s conceptualization of entrepreneurship 
(1983), empirically validated by Brown, Davidsson and Wiklund (2001), positing that 
entrepreneurial companies will be involved in recognizing and exploiting opportunity, 
regardless of the resources controlled. From the literature we hypothesize positive effects of 
entrepreneurial management dimensions on post-MBO financial performance. We find that 
successful buyout managers cannot be classified as entrepreneurs on all entrepreneurial 
dimensions. Instead they ambidextrously combine the pursuit of valuable opportunities with 
the exploitation and control of their resources. Implications for theory and managerial 
practice are discussed. 
 
 
1. Executive summary 
 
The objective of the paper is to further our understanding on the relationship between 
entrepreneurship and financial performance after a management buyout (MBO). The paper 
seeks an answer to the following research question: “To what extent are MBOs involved in 
the pursuit of entrepreneurial opportunities and how does this relate to post-MBO financial 
performance?” The paper draws upon Stevenson’s conceptualization of opportunity-based 
firm behaviour as operationalized and validated by Brown, Davidsson and Wiklund (2001), 
positing that entrepreneurial companies will be involved in recognizing and exploiting 
opportunity, regardless of the resources controlled. This contrasts traditional administrative 
management which emphasizes efficient use of its resources required by fiduciary 
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responsibility. The study empirically tests whether entrepreneurial or administrative 
management predicts positive effects on financial performance post-MBO. 
The relationships between entrepreneurial, administrative behaviour and financial 
performance are investigated using the six dimensions of entrepreneurial management: 
strategic orientation, resource orientation, management structure, reward philosophy, growth 
orientation and entrepreneurial culture (Brown et al. 2001). We link these dimensions with 
important changes that occur in MBOs after cutting the ties with the former parent company 
or after the former private owner have left. The documented changes in the buyout literature 
are respectively: a shift in strategy post-MBO to more growth orientation (Wright et al., 
2001); more sensitivity to optimizing value creation (Bull 1988; Malone 1989 and Wright et 
al.1992); improved flexibility and speed in decision-making (Bruining 1992); introduction of 
equity stakes by incumbent management to realign rewards, risks and change in governance 
(Wright 1985; Singh 1990; Phan and Hill 1995); responding more entrepreneurially to new 
opportunities post-MBO by lifting the investment restriction of former owners (Bruining 
1992; Wright et al. 2001); and the stimulating of entrepreneurial initiatives (Green 1992; 
Zahra, 1995; Bruining, Bonnet and Wright 2004). Based on the extant literature, we 
hypothesize positive effects of entrepreneurial management dimensions on post-MBO 
financial performance. 
Data from 52 MBOs in the period 1996-2000 were analyzed to identify which of the 
entrepreneurship or administrative dimensions impact operating income (EBIT) relative to 
competitors. We find that two entrepreneurial management dimensions, strategic orientation 
and reward philosophy, predict a positive EBIT development relative to competitors. These 
results signal that the management of the buyout companies is driven by the perception of 
valuable opportunities and compensate employees based on the value they add. Surprisingly, 
administrative management dimensions dominate the growth, resource orientation and the 
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culture of successful management buyouts. These results indicate that successful buyout 
managers cannot be classified as entrepreneurs on all entrepreneurial dimensions. Instead 
they ambidextrously combine the pursuit of valuable opportunities with the exploitation and 
control of their own resources. Paradoxically, to operate successful, opportunity perception 
should be reconciled by the need to exploit and control own resources. We argue therefore 
that growth is not an exclusive entrepreneurial issue. Managers need to excel in the 
incongruous demands of entrepreneurial and administrative management in order to increase 
their probability of success. The results also contribute to avoiding premature conclusions 
that entrepreneurial management is under all conditions superior to administrative 
management in creating financial performance. Further research could focus on the question 
how buyout managers successfully combine administrative and entrepreneurial management 
dimensions and how financiers could facilitate that process. 
 
 
2. Introduction 
 
 A MBO involves members of the incumbent management team acquiring a significant 
equity stake as individuals with institutional support in order to control the company (Robbie 
and Wright 1996). Most important sources are divestments from domestic and foreign parent 
companies and succession of the founder/owners. We agree with Malone (1989) that the act 
of purchasing a business does not entitle one to the mantle of “entrepreneur”. Therefore we 
take a closer look on the factors that drive performance post-MBO. 
  Buyouts have traditionally been viewed as involving firms in mature sectors with few 
investment demands and low growth prospects (Jensen 1989). However, the main rationale 
for buyouts has shifted from cost reduction and strategic reorientation in mature sectors to 
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creating value in service and technology sectors through product development and innovation 
(Wright et al. 2000, 2001).  
 Traditionally, value creation post-MBO has been attributed to major efficiency 
improvement, the restructuring of assets, and tax savings through the substitution of equity by 
debt. Most researchers examine operational changes as the source of post-MBO financial 
improvements (Bull 1989; Lichtenberg and Siegel 1989, Wright et al. 1992 and Bruining 
1992) or changes in efficiency (Wright 1985; Kaplan, 1989; Singh 1990; Smith 1990) 
without documenting post-MBO corporate entrepreneurship changes and corresponding 
changes in performance. However, MBOs are increasingly being recognized as involving 
entrepreneurial activities (Malone 1989; Long and Ravenscraft 1993; Zahra 1995; Robbie 
and Wright 1995; Wright et al. 2001; Bruining and Wright 2002). These activities after an 
MBO offer an additional explanation for performance improvement to the general argument 
of restructuring and efficiency generally found in the buyout literature. Therefore this paper is 
an effort to show if and how an MBO impacts the conceptual dimensions of entrepreneurial 
management in the eyes of the CEOs and how these are related to post-MBO financial 
performance.  
Zahra (1995) found for 47 leveraged buyouts (LBOs)2 in the US an increase in post-
LBO commitment to corporate entrepreneurship, measured by innovation, commercializing 
technology, quality and size of research and development, which activities positively impact 
the firm’s productivity and profitability. The author reports that previous LBO studies lack 
attention to the association between corporate entrepreneurship and performance. Apart from 
the study of Zahra, several other authors focus on the relationship between corporate 
entrepreneurship and performance. The study of Long and Ravenscraft (1993), for example, 
                                                 
2 In a Leveraged Buyout (LBO) outside LBO associations are the main owners and apply a high debt to total asset ratio in 
the financial structure of the buyout firm. 
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found that LBOs spending more on research and development than other LBOs had higher 
performance levels. Malone (1989) also reports positive effects of financial leverage on cost 
control, investment selection and on firm performance by enhancing turnover and by new 
product and market development for 56 small and medium sized US firms. Other studies 
offer a snapshot of the effect of MBOs on corporate entrepreneurship. Robbie and Wright 
(1995), for example, focus on entrepreneurial skills of managers leading a proposed buyout 
or buy-in but do not document changes in entrepreneurship activities. Wright et al. (2001) 
develop a conceptual framework for buyouts that differentiates on the one hand between 
managerial and entrepreneurial mindsets and on the other hand between creating wealth 
through enhancing efficiencies and those creating wealth by innovation. The framework 
distinguishes buyout types varying from efficiency, revitalization and entrepreneurial to 
failure, but is not yet empirically tested. A study by Bruining and Wright (2002) documents 
the post-MBO changes in the firm’s entrepreneurial orientation of CEOs and CFOs and the 
way venture capitalists contribute to it. Entrepreneurial orientation is measured by 
dimensions such as autonomy, risk taking, innovation, proactiveness and marketing 
aggressiveness (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996), which characterise and distinguish entrepreneurial 
processes. However, the study does not shed empirical light on the causal relationship 
between changes in the entrepreneurial process and corresponding changes in financial 
performance.  
All the abovementioned studies attach strong importance to empirical research of 
post-MBO entrepreneurial behaviour, because they consider it as critical to the long-term 
vitality of our economy. However, none of the studies referred to above uses an empirically 
tested and validated construct of corporate entrepreneurship that measures the buyout 
manager’s perception by a set of opportunity versus administrative based management 
practices linked to financial performance. This paper uses an empirical basis to explore the 
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quantity of entrepreneurship post-MBO by applying the operationalization of Stevenson’s 
conceptualisation of entrepreneurship as opportunity-based firm behaviour by Brown, 
Davidsson and Wiklund (2001). The research question of this paper focuses on the extent to 
which MBOs are involved in recognizing and exploiting opportunities, or what Stevenson 
(1983) calls entrepreneurial value creation, and how this relates to post-MBO financial 
performance. 
The remainder of this article consists of four sections. First we discuss Stevenson’s 
conceptualisation and the empirical instrument to measure entrepreneurship as opportunity-
based firm behaviour as developed by Brown, Davidsson and Wiklund (2001). Then we link 
the characteristics of MBOs, the financial performance post-MBO with entrepreneurial 
management to develop hypotheses. Next, we discuss the research method and present the 
results of the empirical analysis. The final section draws conclusions and discusses the 
implications of the study’s findings for research and practice of buyouts. 
 
 
3. Entrepreneurial management and MBOs 
 
3.1 Stevenson’s concept 
 
The Stevenson’s concept of corporate entrepreneurship as validated by Brown et al. 
(2001), enables us to measure corporate entrepreneurship in different contexts. As Brown et 
al. (2001) argue, contemporary definitions of entrepreneurship tend to centre around the 
pursuit of opportunity (e.g. Churchill and Muzyka, 1994; Venkataraman, 1997; Brazael, 
1999; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). Stevenson sees entrepreneurship also as the pursuit of 
opportunity. He defines it as a process by which individuals - either on their own or inside 
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organizations - pursue opportunities without regard for the resources they currently control 
(Stevenson, 1983). This means that he sees entrepreneurship irrespectively of the present 
organizational context as entrepreneurial management, a mode different from traditional 
management that propagates control and ownership of resources. His conceptualisation of 
entrepreneurship encompasses two extremes of the behavioural spectrum (Stevenson and 
Gumpert, 1985). On the one side firms are led by an entrepreneurial management that 
optimises pursuing and exploiting opportunities regardless of the resources controlled, and on 
the other side firms led by traditional administrative management making the most efficient 
use of its resources, required by fiduciary responsibility.  
In Stevenson’s conceptualisation of entrepreneurship there is a clear border between 
entrepreneurial and administrative modes of management (see Table 1). In Table 1 the 
entrepreneurial management focus is represented by the opposite of 6 administrative 
management characteristics: strategic orientation, resource orientation, management 
structure, reward philosophy, growth orientation and entrepreneurial culture (Brown et al. 
2001). Both types of management can be classified along the same 6 dimensions which are 
operationalized by statements that are opposite in meaning and pair wise formulated (see 
Appendix 1).  
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Table 1 
Stevenson’s conceptualization of entrepreneurial management (adapted from Brown et al. 
2001). 
Entrepreneurial focus  Conceptual dimensions Administrative focus
Driven by perception of 
opportunity 
←  Strategic orientation → Driven by controlled 
resources
Many stages with minimal 
exposure at each stage 
Episodic use or rent of 
required resources 
 
 
←  Resource orientation → 
A single stage with 
complete commitment out 
of decision
Ownership or employment 
of required resources
Flat, with multiple 
informal networks 
←  Management structure → Hierarchy
Based on value creation ←  Reward philosophy → Based on responsibility and 
seniority
Rapid growth is top 
priority; risk accepted to 
achieve growth 
←  Growth orientation → Safe, slow, steady
Promoting broad search for 
opportunities 
←  Entrepreneurial culture → Opportunity search 
restricted by resources 
controlled; failure punished
 
 
The point of reference for the first dimension strategic orientation of entrepreneurial 
management is a strategy that is motivated by the chances that exist in a certain business 
setting and not by the assets that may be essential to exploit them. In their search for 
opportunities existing assets do not restrict the entrepreneurial managers, while 
administrative managers are led by the principle that opportunities are carried out with the 
assistance of own resources. 
The second dimension resource orientation for entrepreneurial managers is 
characterised by commitment of resources that maximizes value creation while minimizing 
firm resources. Entrepreneurial managers invest stage-wise in small amounts of resources 
after certain goals have been achieved, while administrative managers use capital allocation 
and formal planning systems that force them to carry out thorough analysis in advance with 
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large, but less reversible investments. This makes them less flexible than their entrepreneurial 
colleagues. Another difference between entrepreneurial and administrative management 
concerns the owning of resources. The former are skilled in using financial and human capital 
of others to extract value from them, instead of owning these resources, which is favoured by 
administrative management. 
Entrepreneurial management implements organisational structures that are directed at 
coordinating the key non-controlled resources and tend to be made of multiple informal 
networks that enhance an organisations’ flexibility. This third dimension of management 
structures contrasts the highly routinized work systems the administrative management led 
firm uses in a formal hierarchical way of organizing with clearly defined lines of authority 
and strong diagnostic control systems. 
The fourth dimension reward philosophy of entrepreneurial management attaches 
high importance to creating value. Their employees are rewarded based on their contribution 
to value creation and challenges individuals to take independent action and accountability. 
Administrative management reward their employees on the basis of seniority and by 
measuring how much assets individuals control in the organisation. 
The fifth dimension is growth orientation. Entrepreneurial managers opt for big and 
fast growth in their organization and accept risks to achieve this. They are the opposite of the 
administrative managers who attach the same level of importance to long time survival as to 
growth. Administrative management prefers safe, slow but steady growth, which is quite the 
opposite of what entrepreneurial managers want. 
  The last dimension of Stevenson’s conceptualization of entrepreneurship is 
entrepreneurial culture. In entrepreneurial led firms culture encourages management and 
employees to develop creativity and a broad range of new ideas and organize experiments 
without setting prior limits on opportunity-seeking behaviour. Such culture stimulates 
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organizational learning and the emergence of new ideas and strategies (Simons 1995). 
Administrative management boost only those kinds of ideas and creativity that are related to 
the currently controlled resources in a pre-selected domain. 
 
3.2 MBOs and entrepreneurship hypotheses 
 
MBO firms are examples of organisations that pass a certain threshold during their 
life by changing ownership and offer researchers a special occasion to look into causes and 
effects of performance development that relate back to this event of ownership change. 
Thompson, Wright and Robbie (1992) and Phan and Hill (1995) discovered that managerial 
equity holding in MBOs are more significant drivers of buyout value than debt of which 
Jensen (1993) advocates the positive impact on cost reduction and improved investment 
selection. The authors don’t link their findings explicitly to entrepreneurship or 
entrepreneurial actions. However, according to Davidsson (2003) ownership change as such 
does not constitute entrepreneurship. He argues that only in cases where the change in 
ownership leads to organizational change, such as for example the creation of strategic 
business units, the implementation of autonomous workgroups or quality improvement 
platforms, the MBO facilitates entrepreneurship. Internal reorganization by redeploying its 
resources, for example, can facilitate the offering of new products or services, or a new 
business concept or something that creates a new price-value relation. This changes the 
consumers’ choice or influences competitor behaviour, which can be seen as a contribution to 
influence market forces that drive the market. Bruining and Wright (2002) support this view 
with evidence from case studies on the contribution of venture capitalists with their CEOs to 
the entrepreneurial orientation of the firm post-MBO. They found that the contribution is 
substantial if the venture capitalist represented in the Board of Supervisors tests the feasibility 
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of the business strategy, challenges the status quo, manages pro-actively, develops leadership 
and takes care of succession planning.  
The CEOs of the MBOs cannot afford too high risks because, cut off from their parent 
companies, they have less opportunity to diversify the financial risk. However, their 
commitment to corporate entrepreneurship activities is crucial to achieving the growth 
objectives of the buyout. This is consistent with the literature. Bull (1989, p. 89) 
argues…”that the evidence is convincing that management does change significantly after an 
LBO. The management change is interpreted as one of becoming entrepreneurial, subject to 
the severe constraint that a high level of debt must be serviced”. According to Easterwood et 
al. (1989) this may be achieved by generating revenue from existing businesses and/or by 
venturing into new fields, such as modifying products, processes and organizational systems. 
Collectively, these changes spur post-MBO’ commitment to corporate entrepreneurship 
(Malone 1989; Wright et al. 1992). 
Stevenson submits that firms with high scores on entrepreneurship exhibit more 
entrepreneurial behaviour than firms with high scores on administrative management. He 
explicitly states that entrepreneurial firms will show consistently prevailing scores at the 
entrepreneurial management end in contrast to the traditional firms that will prefer the 
managerial or administrative management mode. Whether the entrepreneurial management 
dimensions from the Brown et al. construct are generally positively related to post-MBO 
financial performance is not clear, although the literature suggests that entrepreneurship 
positively relates to improved performance. In general, knowledge about external and 
organisational factors that stimulate entrepreneurial management is crucial for understanding 
the dynamics of a firm. In the following paragraph we link external and organisational factors 
to the buyout firm that challenge or limit entrepreneurship post-MBO and formulate our 
hypotheses. 
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3.2. Buyouts and Entrepreneurship Hypotheses 
 
In this paragraph we highlight important changes that occur in MBOs after cutting the 
ties with the parent company. In the first place a significant share of MBOs divested from 
parent companies face changes to a more growth-oriented strategy and in the process of 
strategy formulation, implementation and modification. Buyout managers undertake efforts to 
balance traditional diagnostic control systems with newer interactive control systems that 
stimulate opportunity seeking and learning (Bruining et al. 2004). Instead of obeying orders 
from headquarters that block innovation and investment in order to optimise the goals of the 
diversified parent company, the buyout managers have discretionary power to decide what is 
best for the business and how the business plan can be carried out most profitably for 
themselves as a firm (Wright, et al. 2001). Buyout managers are motivated by the market 
chances they see in the business setting and that they were unable to grasp as former directors 
of a subsidiary. Hence we formulate: 
 
Hypothesis 1. Post-MBO financial performance is positively related to the strategic 
orientation of entrepreneurial management. 
 
The buyout management team per definition takes a substantial equity stake in the firm and 
runs a higher financial risk than before the buyout where they had no stake in the equity of 
the firm, or very little. The pressure of the new shareholders and the new owner/manager on 
improving firm performance post-MBO within the new financial constraints as an 
independent firm will challenge return on investment post-MBO. However, the financial 
resources for internal growth and/or external expansion post-MBO mostly come from the 
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firm’s own cash flows. Therefore they put effort in perceiving opportunities to re-deploy 
resources away from present, sub-optimal configurations to more promising opportunities. 
Empirical studies offer support for an entrepreneurial management perspective in situations 
of higher debt levels. With regard to U.S. post-MBO performance studies, for example, Bull 
(1989) find some support for the agency cost-reduction argument, but observes that the most 
influence came from the greater entrepreneurial alertness to opportunities to create value.  
Malone (1989) reports for 56 leveraged MBOs despite increased interest and principal 
payments no lay-offs in personnel or sale of assets. On the contrary the buyouts improve 
strongly their cost control and capital budgeting and show an increase in turnover through 
intensifying sales as well as product and market development. Wright et al. (1992) in a UK-
based study find that 62.3 percent of the 182 buyouts surveyed introduce new products that 
they would not have done before the MBO. In a recent survey by the Dutch Association of 
Venture Capitalists (NVP 2004) in cooperation with CMBOR, 56 percent of the private 
equity backed Dutch buyout companies stated that they have developed faster as a result of 
the buyout. The study reveals that MBOs engage in strategic actions following the change in 
ownership. A majority report increase in the range of products (65 percent) and markets (52 
percent), suggesting a highly beneficial effect of the buyout on growth by acting in a more 
entrepreneurial manner.  Despite the higher interest and principal payments post-MBO, we 
expect more sensitivity to resources that maximizes value creation, also using resources from 
collaborative relationships with other firms, while minimizing the firm’s own resources. 
Therefore we formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2. Post-MBO financial performance is positively related to the resource 
orientation of entrepreneurial management. 
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The shift from maintaining the status quo pre-MBO to acting more efficiently and 
entrepreneurially post-MBO (Wright et al. 2001), requires more organisational flexibility 
than before the buyout. Dependent on the new owners' conception of the environment and 
perspective of the organisation-environment relationship, the firm has to develop flexibility. 
The capability, for example, for facilitating emergent, spontaneous strategies, terminating 
unprofitable existing activities and developing flexible resources for effective response to 
(un)anticipated changes (Volberda, 1998, p.43). Structures that enhance the high speed of 
decision-making and adapting are informal in nature, leaving room for job-behaviour of 
managers and workers to adapt freely to changing circumstances. Multiple informal networks 
between the buyout firm and other firms will develop to coordinate the non-controlled 
resources. These collaborative relationships with other firms were not possible during their 
stay in the parent company and very problematic in case the buyout firm was sold to an 
industrial partner, due to existing competitive relationships (Bruining 1992). Hence we 
formulate: 
 
Hypothesis 3. Post-MBO financial performance is positively related to the management 
structure of entrepreneurial management. 
 
“If entrepreneurship requires alertness and responsiveness there first has to be a 
structure of incentives which makes it worth the CEO’s time looking in the first place. The 
private equity suppliers require that the equity stake is held in the hands of a clearly 
identifiable group which has responsibility for running the company. This gives them a 
guarantee that the focus of the firm’s objectives is commercial and profit orientated (Wright 
1985, pp.48 and 89)”. The incentive compensation for the MBO managers is dependent on 
achieving targets for profits and turnover. As new owners, they run the company at their own 
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risk and thus want to improve the firm’s financial performance. To increase the value of the 
firm they need the cooperation from their key-personnel even more than before the buyout in 
order to streamline the established and develop new business. From an agency perspective the 
issue is to define in an entrepreneurial context who is the principal and who is the agent in 
order to provide the set of incentives for engaging in entrepreneurship. Balancing rewards 
and risks for key personnel in organisations can promote internal corporate entrepreneurship, 
the process by which firms notice opportunities and act to create surplus value. Companies 
that face strategic uncertainties challenge personal and organisational flexibility and 
adaptability (Jones and Butler, 1992). Singh (1990) shows empirically that firms after buyout 
have focused boards and higher stock ownership levels for managers and directors. Hence:  
 
Hypothesis 4. Post-MBO financial performance is positively related to the reward 
philosophy of entrepreneurial management. 
 
From the entrepreneurship literature (Miller 1983; Covin and Slevin 1991, 1993; Lumpkin 
and Dess 1996, 1999; Wiklund, 1999) we know that environmental variables moderate the 
entrepreneurship-firm performance relationship. This relationship, for example, is positively 
or negatively moderated by the extent of hostility, of dynamism and of heterogeneity in the 
firm’s environment. It is well known that managers pre-MBO face investment restrictions 
from HQ because their firms are peripheral to the product line of the parent company (Wright 
et al. 2001). This may decrease the possibilities of responding entrepreneurially to these 
moderating factors: e.g. by avoiding or reacting aggressively to competitor’s actions, by 
responding to changing customer’s needs or by innovation in products and development of 
markets. After the buyout this situation is reversed. Pre-MBO buyout firms are not allowed to 
have growth-oriented strategies and organisations. This conflict between subsidiary 
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management and HQ is often an indication that a buyout may be appropriate (Bruining 1992, 
Wright et al. 2001). Once the MBO is a fact, top managers experience more immediate 
freedom and independence, which enable more flexible decision-making, more delegation, 
quicker action and easier consensus among manager/owners and shareholders (Bruining 
1992). This creates greater room at the firm level for the autonomy dimension of corporate 
entrepreneurship. In a recent survey by the Dutch Association of Venture Capitalists (NVP) 
in cooperation with CMBOR (Nottingham, UK) and Erasmus University, 56 percent of the 
private equity backed Dutch buyout companies stated that they have developed faster as a 
result of the buyout. The study reveals that MBOs engage in strategic actions following the 
change in ownership. A majority report increase in the range of products (65 percent) and 
markets (52 percent), suggesting a highly beneficial effect of the buyout on growth by acting 
more entrepreneurial.  Hence we formulate: 
 
Hypothesis 5. Post-MBO financial performance is positively related to the growth orientation 
of entrepreneurial management. 
 
In a buyout, distance between policy and implementation is likely to become significantly 
shorter, because of the remarriage of ownership and control (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). 
The management layers between subsidiary and parent are taken away, which enables 
quicker decision-making and action. Jones (1992) found that chief executive 
officers/managing directors from buyout firms used existing management accounting 
techniques to communicate their managerial philosophies concerning the internal functioning 
of the firm that was reflected in increased importance of participation in budgeting. New 
owner-managers show higher levels of commitment to the implementation of a growth 
oriented strategy than before the MBO (Zahra, 1995; Wright, et al. 2001). They are no longer 
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frustrated by the bureaucratic organisation of the former parent company to get their 
decisions accepted, which fuels their strength of mind to carry out their own policy and plans.  
In turn, this is likely to change the organisational culture to one that is more entrepreneurially 
driven (Green, 1992), stimulating intrapreneurship, customer focus and quality orientation 
(Bruining et al. 2004). Therefore we formulate: 
 
Hypothesis 6. Post-MBO financial performance is positively related to the entrepreneurial 
culture of entrepreneurial management. 
 
 
4. Method 
 
In addition to managing activities more efficiently post-MBO, it is our view that 
respondents are extra motivated to be aware of the relevant organisational and environmental 
conditions that foster entrepreneurship within the established business than without an 
ownership change. As a consequence we expect they can reflect better on the degree of 
entrepreneurship on firm-level shown post-MBO as compared to pre-MBO. This is most 
helpful for testing the empirical measure of Stevenson’s corporate entrepreneurship. From 52 
CEOs of Dutch firms that underwent a buyout during 1996-2000, information gathered by 
questionnaire is analysed on how post-MBO the firm's financial performance and financial 
leverage developed, and what views the CEOs held on entrepreneurship at firm level. All 
Dutch buyouts completed in between 1996-2000 are surveyed (response rate 18%) in 2002 
and are supplied by the Centre for Management Buyout Research (CMBOR). We tested the 
representativeness of the sample with respect to the source of the MBO transaction and found 
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no significant differences. However, MBOs in the service industry seem to be slightly 
overrepresented in the total sample (n=26). 
We use the operationalization of Stevenson’s conceptual dimensions of 
entrepreneurship developed and validated by Brown, Davidson and Wiklund (2001). Next we 
validated the Stevenson’s dimensions by using factor analyses using varimax rotation. The 
results confirmed the findings of Brown et al. (2001) and showed six independent dimensions 
with alphas above the .70 reliability threshold. Subsequently, we regressed the Stevenson’s 
dimensions of entrepreneurship with the performance measure represented by Operating 
Profit (EBIT) relative to competitors. We choose for the measure EBIT or Operational 
Income, a rudimentary form of cash flow, because other yardsticks like Net Profit are heavily 
influenced by the firm’s depreciation policies and financial leverage. By applying the 
operationalization of entrepreneurial management we can study the degree of 
entrepreneurship and its effect on financial performance in a sample of buyouts across 
different contexts. We use multiple regression analysis to examine how entrepreneurship 
dimensions impact perceived operating profit (EBIT) relative to competitors. We control for 
differences in financial leverage (measured as total debt related to total assets), deal price 
advantage (measured as the price paid relative to the market price) of the MBO firm as well 
as for firm size (measured as the natural logarithm of the number of full-time employees at 
the time of the MBO). 
 
5. Results 
 
5.1. Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations  
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Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and bivariate correlation coefficients for variables under 
study. Inspection of the Pearson correlations shows that there are relatively few significant 
correlations and none of these correlations have a value higher than .50. Furthermore, we calculated 
the VIF scores for all independent variables. The VIF values were all well below 3 which indicates 
that multicollinearity is not likely to be problem. 
 
 
Table  2 
Descriptive statistics and bivariate Pearson correlations 
  
 
 Study variables Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Strategic orientation 6.33 1.98 1     
2. Resource orientation 5.72 1.20 .04 1     
3. Management 
structure 
5.50 1.37 .22 .34 1     
4. Reward philosophy 5.93 1.31 .03 .08 .42 1     
5. Growth orientation 5.49 2.05 .12 .25 .40 .31 1    
6. Entrepreneurial 
culture 
5.23 1.78 -.18 -.03 -.03 -.10 -.03 1   
7. Debt Ratio 3.69 1.29 -.18 -.14 -.35 -.16 -.41 .30 1  
8. Deal price advantage 2.29 .75 .13 -.23 -.21 .03 .09 .06 -.01 1 
9. Log Size 1.68 .56 -.15 .11 -.27 -.16 -.19 .09 .41 -.10 1
 
Bold: correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
 
5.2. Hypotheses testing 
 
The model is estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and the 
estimation results are presented in Table 3. 
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Table 3 
Regression of entrepreneurial dimensions on post buyout performance (EBIT relative to 
competitors) 
 
Variables 
 
 
B 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
β 
Constant 
Strategic Orientation  
Resource Orientation 
Management Structure 
Reward Philosophy 
Growth Orientation 
Entrepreneurial Culture 
Debt Ratio 
Deal Price Advantage 
Log Size 
2.88 
  .10 
 -.18 
  .10 
  .17 
 -.10 
 -.08 
 -.16 
  .25 
  .53 
.87 
 .05 
.08 
 .08 
 .07 
.05 
.05 
.08 
 .12 
 .17 
 
 .25* 
-.28* 
.17 
 .30* 
-.26* 
-.20* 
-.27* 
 .25* 
  .39** 
 
Adjusted R2 = .38  F-value = 4.42  P<.0001 N= 52 
*p<.05; **p<.01 (two sided) 
 
 
The F-value of 4.42 is substantially higher than the 99% critical F-value. The 
regression equation is therefore statistically significant. The adjusted R2 is .38 which 
indicates that the model - adjusted for the degrees of freedom - can explain 38% of variance 
of post-MBO financial performance, measured as EBIT relative to competitors. With regard 
to development of EBIT, in only 4 percent of the cases the CEOs report lagging figures, 21 
percent perceive no change and 75 percent signal strong to very strong improvement. 
The results of the OLS regression in Table 3 show that two entrepreneurial 
management dimensions namely strategic orientation (β=.25; p<.05) and reward philosophy 
(β=.30; p<.05) contribute positively to EBIT relative to competitors. These findings support 
hypotheses 1 and 4. However, these two dimensions of entrepreneurial management are 
combined with three administrative management dimensions represented by resource 
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orientation (β=-.28; p<.05), growth orientation (β=-.26; p<.05) and the entrepreneurial culture 
of the buyout firm (β=-.20; p<.05). Therefore, the results do not support hypotheses 2, 3 and 
6. On the contrary, resource orientation, growth orientation and entrepreneurial culture are 
negatively related to post-MBO financial performance. Finally, table 3 shows that 
management structure is the only dimension from Stevenson’s construct that is not a 
significant predictor for EBIT development. Hypothesis 3 is therefore not supported by the 
evidence. Overall, these results indicate that both entrepreneurial as well as administrative 
management are positively related to the dependent variable EBIT. 
The control variables are all significant and show a substantial influence on EBIT 
development relative to the MBO firms’ competitors. The control variables debt ratio, deal 
price advantage and buyout firm size are substantial and significant, indicating strong 
negative effect for the first and strong positive effects for the other control variables on the 
relationship between entrepreneurial/administrative management and EBIT post-MBO. 
Finally, we estimated the model including a dummy variable service to check if the 
overrepresentation of service firms may have biased the results. However, the variable proved 
to be insignificant and the parameter estimates did not change so we excluded the variable 
from the model. 
 
 
6. Conclusions and discussion 
 
In MBOs the positive development of EBIT relative to competitors depends on an 
entrepreneurial strategic orientation and reward philosophy combined with an administrative 
focus on resources, growth and entrepreneurial culture. The buyout management team has to 
excel in both extremes of Stevenson’s concept of corporate entrepreneurship. These results 
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indicate that successful buyout managers ambidextrously combine the pursuit of valuable 
opportunities with the exploitation and control of their own resources. Paradoxically, to 
operate financially successful, opportunity perception should be reconciled by the need to 
exploit and control own resources. We argue therefore that growth is not an exclusive 
entrepreneurial issue. Buyout managers need to excel in the incongruous entrepreneurial and 
administrative dimensions of entrepreneurial management in order to increase their 
probability of success. 
The results also contribute to avoiding premature conclusions that entrepreneurial 
management is under all conditions superior to administrative management in creating 
financial performance. Post-MBO the management balances administrative management 
promoting the use and control of own resources and the orientation in terms of opportunities 
in selected areas with entrepreneurial management facilitating change and growth driven by 
the perception of opportunity and rewarding value creation. It seems that the buyout is an 
opportunity representing simultaneously more leeway for its management under the condition 
of new (financial) resources constraints. Therefore we argue that post-MBO the CEOs don’t 
want to take opportunities that do not fit the risk the company can afford. This supports 
Penrose (1959) view that established firms have critical resources embedded in the firm that 
can better focus on enduring resources. However, the size of the MBOs enables them to 
identify chances early and take decisions quickly with regard to developing new products or 
entering new markets. Obviously the perception of valuable opportunities is not blocked by 
heavy obligations of pay off principal and interest of increased debt. However, the 
perspective of big and fast growth as a top priority and having more promising ideas than 
time and resources to pursue is not attractive for successful buyout managers. Post-MBO the 
management has to use own cash flow for investment and this shortage of money for 
investment and the lack of risk diversification post-MBO contribute to the CEO’s cautious 
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attitude towards resources and growth and thus to an entrepreneurial culture without an eye 
for resource limitations.  
Further research must examine the effects of an increase or a decrease of financial 
leverage over time on the dimensions of Stevenson’s construct in coherence with financial 
performance. Perhaps then we could find out if financial leverage will continue to have a 
negative effect in the eyes of the CEO on EBIT, or that this negative effect is compensated by 
better decisions to explore and exploit the upside potential of the buyout firm, thereby 
moving the resource dimension towards the entrepreneurial side of the continuum. 
Furthermore, with respect to this effect of financial leverage on post-MBO financial 
performance, the role of the private equity suppliers have to be taken into account. Private 
equity suppliers may find an increasing risk profile of the company after the approved 
business plans and the complementary financial structure to be an unattractive idea. This by 
itself may be a cause of the success of an administrative attitude of buyout managers with 
regard to resources. A practical implication from this study may be that financers should be 
more sensitive to balancing the gap between entrepreneurial and administrative management 
dimensions, for example by broadening the resource base that allows MBOs to develop a 
more entrepreneurial resource orientation and culture. This will require enhanced capabilities 
for targeting and monitoring with regard to their own portfolio, but also for screening high 
potentials among the small and medium sized buyouts. 
Our sample consists of 31 percent small firms with less than 50 employees and 22 
percent of firms with more than 50 and less than 100 employees, and 47 percent with more 
than 100 employees. We argue that the larger the firm the greater the chance that they use 
multiple informal networks and a flat hierarchy as the dominant management structure 
instead of hierarchy, that is mostly found in small and medium sized companies. This may 
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explain why the indicator management structure was not a significant predictor of a 
favourable EBIT post-MBO. 
 We must be careful in interpreting the findings for all types of buyouts. In our sample 
the insiders as the incumbent management and employees own a majority of 62 percent of the 
firm’s equity, while a minority of 30 percent of the firm’s equity is in the hands of outsiders 
like private equity suppliers and informal investors. It may be that in the case of outsider 
dominated buyouts the firms act more entrepreneurially and are larger because of investment 
preferences of the PE firms. Therefore we think that our results are in particular relevant for 
insider dominated management and or employee buyouts. It is justifiable given the 
considerable effect of the control variable size on financial performance post-MBO to 
examine further its moderating role. 
Our survey was undertaken in a period of economic downturn, and this may be 
reflected in respondents’ preferences for wording of growth orientation as long-term survival 
and sure and steady growth situated at the administrative management side of the 
entrepreneurship measures. During a recession the management of the firms can experience 
difficulties to find a sufficient number of promising ideas to utilize all their assets. The 
buyout managers may be more focused on valuable opportunities within the limits of their 
own resources. However, this may also extend the set of conditions which relate to our 
findings. For example, during a period of economic downturn even managers of financially 
balanced companies may find it difficult to gain access to external resources and need to 
excel simultaneously in the incongruous demands of entrepreneurial and administrative 
management in order to increase their probability of success. 
Finally we make some concluding remarks about the control variables in Table 3. 
With regard to the control variable dealprice advantage, measuring the deal price paid relative 
to the marketprice, we propose further research. Given its significance in our regression 
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model and the absence of this factor in buyout literature as an important explanatory factor 
for performance improvement post-MBO, we did not expect this variable might perhaps be 
playing a significant moderating role in the entrepreneurial management and financial 
performance relationship. 
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Appendix A 
(Source: Brown et al. 2001) 
 
 
 
1. As we define our strategies, 
our major concern is how to 
best utilize the resources we 
control. 
 
2. We limit the opportunities 
we pursue on the basis of our 
current resources. 
 
3. The resources we have 
significantly influence our 
business strategies. 
Strategic Orientation 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 
 
 
 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 
 
 
 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 
 
As we define our strategies, 
we are driven by our 
perception of opportunity. 
We are not constrained by 
the resources at (or not at) 
hand. 
Our fundamental task is to 
pursue opportunities we 
perceive as valuable and 
then to acquire the 
resources to exploit them. 
Opportunities control our 
business strategies. 
 
1. Since we do not need 
resources to commence the 
pursuit of an opportunity, 
our commitment of resources 
may be in stages. 
2. All we need from resources 
is the ability to use them. 
5. We like to employ 
resources that we borrow or 
rent. 
6. In exploiting opportunities, 
having the idea is more 
important than just having 
the money. 
 
Resource Orientation 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 
 
 
 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 
 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 
 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 
 
 
Since our objective is to use 
our resources, we will 
usually invest heavily and 
rapidly. (R) 
 
We prefer to totally control 
and own the resources we 
use. (R) 
We prefer to only use our 
own resources in our 
ventures. (R) 
In exploiting opportunities, 
access to money is more 
important than just having 
the idea. (R) 
 
1. We prefer tight control of 
funds and operations by 
means of sophisticated 
control and information 
systems. 
2. We strongly emphasize 
getting things done by 
following formal processes 
and procedures. 
 
3. We strongly emphasize 
holding to tried and true 
management principles and 
industry norms. 
 
4. There is a strong insistence 
on a uniform management 
style throughout the firm. 
Management Structure 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 
 
 
 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 
 
 
 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 
 
 
 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 
 
 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 
 
 
We prefer loose, informal 
control. There is a 
dependence on informal 
relations. 
 
We strongly emphasize 
getting things done even if 
this means disregarding 
formal procedure. 
 
We strongly emphasize 
adapting freely to changing 
circumstances without 
much concern for past 
practices. 
Managers' operating styles 
are allowed to range freely 
from very formal to very 
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5. There is a strong emphasis 
on getting line and staff 
personnel to adhere closely 
to their formal job 
descriptions. 
 
informal. 
 
There is a strong tendency 
to let the requirements of 
the situation and the 
personality of the 
individual dictate proper 
job behaviour. 
 
1. Our employees are 
evaluated and compensated 
based on their 
responsibilities. 
 
2. Our employees are 
evaluated and compensated 
based on their 
responsibilities. 
 
3. An employee's standing is 
based on the amount of 
responsibility s/he has. 
 
Reward Philosophy 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 
 
 
 
 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 
 
 
 
 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 
 
 
Our employees are 
evaluated and compensated 
based on the value they add 
to the firm. 
 
 
We try to compensate our 
employees by devising 
ways so they can benefit 
from the increased value of 
the firm. 
 
An employee's standing is 
based on the value s/he 
adds. 
 
4. It is generally known 
throughout the firm that 
growth is our top objective. 
 
5. It is generally known 
throughout the firm that our 
intention is to grow as big 
and as fast as possible. 
 
Growth orientation 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 
 
 
 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 
 
Growth is not necessarily 
our top objective. Long-
term survival may be at 
least as important. (R) 
 
 
It is generally known 
throughout the firm that 
steady and sure growth is 
the best way to expand. (R) 
 
 
1.We have many more 
promising ideas than we have 
time and the resources to 
pursue them. 
 
2. Changes in the society-at-
large often give us ideas for 
new products and services. 
 
3. We never experience a lack 
of ideas that we can convert 
into profitable 
products/services. 
Entrepreneurial Culture 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 
 
 
 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 
 
 
 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 
 
We find it difficult to find a 
sufficient number of 
promising ideas to utilize 
all of our resources. (R) 
 
Changes in society-at-large 
seldom lead to 
commercially promising 
ideas for our firm. (R) 
 
It is difficult for our firm to 
find ideas that can be 
converted into profitable 
products/services. (R) 
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